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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Warren P. Hil*
Admissibility of Results of Chemical Test of Defendant's Hands Indicating Presence of Blood Stains-In a recent murder trial in Massachusetts the sole issue was the identity of the perpetrator of the slaying
of an aged caretaker in a wayside diner. The state's case against the
nineteen year old defendant was wholly circumstantial and as the
appellate court in its affirmance admitted, "might well have been
stronger." Only the most tenuous connection was established between
the accused and the sordid crime, based on an admission the defendant
had made to a friend on the night of the killing. No fingerprints were
found, nor blood on the defendant's clothing, nor was the defendant's
conduct subsequent to the date of the crime inconsistent with his
innocence. Yet the verdict of the jury was upheld largely on the basis
of the testimony of a chemist as to the results of a benzidrene reagent
test made on the defendant's hands three days after the crime. According to this witness, blood will seep down into the pores and
crevices of the skin and withstand washings for as long as five days.
It was contended by the defense that an identical blue reaction could
be produced on someone who had come in contact with plant tissues,
and more cogently, that the blood could have come from any number
of sources, even from the accused himself. The Supreme Judicial
Court nevertheless held the test results competent evidence. Commonwealth v. Moore, 80 N. E. (2d) 24 (Mass., 1948).
Mode of Proof in Prosecution for Falsely Impersonating a Police OfficerOn the appeal in Taylor v. United States, App. D. C. 1948, No. 9697,
the Government attorneys were sharply reprimanded by Judge Clark for
their failure to affirmatively show that the defendant in the impersonation
proceeding below was in fact not a police officer. The "easy and conventional" manner of proving such crimes, according to the Court of
Appeals, is to put the officer in charge of the official rolls and records
on the witness stand and have him testify from them whether the
defendant was at the time a member of the force. However, even in
view of this failure of proof, the verdict of conviction was affirmed
on the basis of the established principle "that where defendant is
charged with falsely pretending to be an officer of the United States,
and he fails to produce evidence showing he was such an officer, the
presumption arises that the evidence, if produced, would have been
unfavorable to defendant." This inference from inaction on the part
of the defense was supported by evidence that at the time of arrest
the defendant had not once offered to produce credentials, was without
a badge, and attempted to escape when his thin guise of authority was
stripped from him.
* Senior Law Student, Northwestern University School of Law.
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Chief of Police Must Qualify as an Expert Before Testifying on Operation of a Handbook-In a trial of a gambling charge without a jury,
the state called the chief of police to the stand and without testing
his competency as to the lore of horse-racing nor demonstrating his
personal knowledge of the facts, proceeded to have the chief identify
certain racing forms, tickets and other paraphernalia commonly used
in the operation of a handbook which were seized at the time of defendant's arrest. Defense counsel objected throughout to the effect
that the witness had not been qualified as an expert and was not
stating even the source of his information or the basis of his opinions.
Upon conviction and appeal therefrom, a majority of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana thought these objections well taken and remanded
the case for a new trial. A comparison of the majority and two dissenting opinions reveals interestingly the wholly subjective nature in
close cases of the distinction, carefully observed in the law of evidence,
between matters of fact and opinion. To the judges of the majority,
the questions propounded to the chief involved "knowledge obtained
only by means of special training or experience." The terms employed
"are not matters of common knowledge" and required elucidationy
an expert. On the other hand, the seized documents held no mystery
for the dissenting judges. Because the documents "spoke for themselves," the chief when identifying them was testifying as to facts and
not giving his conclusions based on some special learning. Analogizing,
one judge said, "One does not have to be an experienced gambler to
testify that a poker chip is a poker chip, and to explain how it is used
in the game. These articles involved here ... are not unusual things
about which the public in general is totally ignorant. The Daily Racing
Form may be purchased at any news stand." State v. Damico, 35 So.
(2d) 654 (La., 1948).

Criminatory Admission During Illegal Detention of Motorist Validates
Subsequent Seizure of Contraband-The question decided in Brinegar
v. United States, 165 F. (2d) 512 (C. C. A. 10th, 1948), was whether an
equivocal or vaguely incriminating statement made by the accused
during the progress of a concededly unlawful search of himself and
his car could be used to furnish the "probable cause" needed to validate the otherwise invalid seizure of contraband therein. After being
stopped and arrested on the basis of little or no reliable evidence, the
officers inquired of defendant as to how much liquor he was carrying,
as to which he replied, "Not too much." Purporting to rely on this
admission, the officers then searched the trunk and indeed found a
copious supply of whiskey. The majority of the Circuit Court of Appeals felt that the only test to apply under the circumstances was one
of voluntariness, viz., whether under the so-called Federal rule of confessions the statement by itself would have been admissible in a criminal trial. As no coercion of the defendant was proved the conviction
based upon the evidence thus obtained was affirmed. Writ of certiorari
has been granted by the United States Supreme Court. (16 L. W. 2300).
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The Right to Counsel in Probation Revocation Proceedings-Where there
is a strongly contested issue of fact in a probation revocation proceeding as to identity of the person who committed the crime with which
defendant is charged, the Illinois Appellate Court holds that the probationer has the right to procure his own counsel or, if unable, to
have a public defender appointed to assist him in cross-exaihining the
accusing witnesses. In the case under scrutiny the state had contended
that the probationer had stolen a woman's purse on a street car, thus
warranting revocation of probation. Defendant denied having been
on the car and having taken the purse. Certain facts brought to light
gave strong credence to his assertions. He requested that he be allowed
counsel to more effectively present his defense. On review of the order
of revocation, the court expressed some doubts as to the substantiality
of the evidence linking defendant to the purse-snatching charge, observing that although under the Probation Act a violation need not
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, still any showing less than the
most convincing proof on the issue of identity "would not satisfy the
requirements of justice." On the issue as to whether counsel is requisite
to defend against a charge of probation violation, the court said: "We
are not unmindful of the rule set forth in People v. Poster, 394 II. 194,
68 N. E. (2d) 252, aff'd 332 U. S. 134 [holding that a trial court need
not apprise the accused in a non-capital criminal trial of his right to
counsel]. The record before us plainly indicates that the defendant
wanted an attorney and thought he had one. We think that justice
required that he be given some opportunity to determine whether he
had an attorney and if he did not have one, to obtain one. On the
other hand, if, for some reason, the court did not see fit to continue the
hearing, the defendant should have been offered the service of the
Public Defender." People v. Burrell, 79 N. E. (2d) 88 (Ill. App., 1948).
(Regarding revocation of parole proceedings generally, see Vol. 37 of
this Journalat p. 308.)
Evidence Illegally Seized Admissible for Purposes of Revoking Suspended Sentence-Whereas the court in the preceding case seemed to
recogiiize the substantial equivalence between a hearing on charges of
violation of probation and an ordinary criminal trial so far as fairness
to the accused is concerned, the Florida Supreme Court in Brill v.
State, 32 So. (2d) 607 (Fla., 1948), held the two types of proceedings
distinguishable on the question of whether evidence ordinarily inadmissible could be considered by the judge in a revocation hearing.
After the defendant had been arrested on the basis of information that
he was again engaged in "moonshining" operations, agents raided his
home without a warrant and seized a still therein. This evidence was
subsequently judicially suppressed when the state threatened to prosecute anew. However, when the defendant was brought before the court
for hearing on the charge of violating the "good behavior" condition
of his suspended sentence on a conviction eight years before, the judge
ruled the seized articles admissible for the purposes of that particular
hearing. The Florida Supreme Court confirmed this ruling, saying:
"Such hearings are informal and do not take the course of a regular
trial, nor does the evidence have the same objective as that taken at a
regular trial. Its purpose is to satisfy the conscience of the court as
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to whether the condition of the suspended sentence has been violated.
A second purpose is to give the person accused a chance to explain
away the accusation, but even this does not contemplate a strict or
formal trial .. information as to whether a suspended sentence for
selling moonshine liquor has been violated is different in category from
evidence appropriate to convict one of a crime."
The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court-An
article bearing the foregoing title appears in the current (SeptemberOctober) issue of the Illinois Law Review. The author is Fred E. Inbau,
Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
Mr. Inbau's article discusses the development of the present Supreme Court's attitude regarding the admissibility of confessions in
federal and state cases. It deals specifically with the problem now
before the Supreme Court in Upshaw v. United States, 168 F. (2d) 167,
68 S. Ct. 1505, in which the Court is faced with the dilemma it created
for itself by the McNabb and Mitchell case decisions (318 U. S. 332;
322 U. S.65). The article also presents for the Court's consideration an
extensive discussion of the practical police difficulties regarding the
matter of confessions. Mr. Inbau suggests that the Court's best way
out of the dilemma is to overrule the McNabb case. (Copies of the
Review may be secured from the office of the Illinois Law Review,
357 East Chicago Avenue, Chicago 11, Illinois, at a cost of $1.00.)

